Responding to The Will of the People: An Introduction to a Symposium in Reaction to Barry Friedman\u27s Book by Staszewski, Glen
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2010
Responding to The Will of the People: An
Introduction to a Symposium in Reaction to Barry
Friedman's Book
Glen Staszewski
Michigan State University College of Law, staszew2@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For
more information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glen Staszewski, Responding to The Will of the People: An Introduction to a Symposium in Reaction to Barry Friedman's Book, 2010
Mich. St. L. Rev. 551 (2010).
RESPONDING TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO A SYMPOSIUM IN REACTION
TO BARRY FRIEDMAN'S BOOK
Glen Staszewski*
2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 551
Constitutional theorists have struggled for many years with the legiti-
macy of allowing unelected judges to invalidate the policy decisions of
elected representatives on constitutional grounds. While legal scholars have
been obsessed with the countermajoritarian difficulty that is allegedly posed
by judicial review in a democracy, political scientists have sought to explain
what motivates judicial decision-making in the absence of meaningful legal
constraints. The leading factors political scientists have identified include
the partisan affiliations of the justices, their personal policy preferences, and
occasional concerns about the institutional interests of the judiciary. Not
only are these findings difficult to square with traditional conceptions of the
rule of law, but they would appear to exacerbate the countermajoritarian
difficulty given the life tenure and unelected status of federal judges.
Professor Barry Friedman's comprehensive examination of the history
of the relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion, The Will
of the People, challenges important aspects of the conventional wisdom in
law and political science. Friedman contends not only that the public sup-
ports the institution of judicial review, but also that, "[olver time, through a
dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the considered
judgment of the American people regarding their most fundamental val-
ues."' If it is true that the Court's decisions ultimately reflect the will of the
people, then the democratic legitimacy of judicial review can no longer be
so easily disparaged on the grounds that the practice is "counter-
majoritarian." Moreover, if the justices are compelled to reach decisions
that are consistent with the will of the people, they are subject to a meaning-
ful constraint that may dissuade them from voting based solely on partisan
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or ideological grounds, even if the law does not provide definitive answers
to constitutional questions. Friedman, therefore, ultimately concludes that
the "threat" of judicial review to American democracy is overstated, and
that we should be more concerned about the Court's ability to fulfill its
"hope" of protecting the fundamental rights of minorities: "What we ought
to care deeply about, what we ought to be asking, is how much capacity the
justices have to act independently of the public's views, how likely they are
to do so, and in what situations."2
William Novak points out in his contribution that The Will of the
People "has been widely noted and much discussed, including an enviable
full-page review in the New York Times calling it both 'authoritative' and
'riveting' and praising 'the detail and breadth of its historical canvas."
Moreover, in the world of legal blogs, there seems to be little question that
Friedman's work is widely considered one of the most important books of
the past year. If law professors had a version of the academy awards, The
Will of the People would undoubtedly be nominated for "best picture." One
thing that all of the participants in this Symposium agree upon is that the
book is the product of tremendous effort, and that it is an incredibly ambi-
tious and important contribution to the literature on the Supreme Court and
the American Constitution.
As a study of the history of the relationship between the Supreme
Court and public opinion, Friedman's book is a multi-disciplinary blend of
history, political science, and legal scholarship. In my view, he should be
given a great deal of credit for taking on a major project that cuts across at
least three disciplines. One of our primary goals in organizing this Sympo-
sium was to respond to The Will of the People from a range of disciplinary
perspectives. We are fortunate to have brought together a talented group of
scholars of constitutional theory, American constitutional history, compara-
tive constitutionalism, and law and politics to react to Friedman's book. In
my view, Friedman should also be given a great deal of credit for self-
consciously exposing his work to critical scrutiny from experts in each of
these various disciplines. Indeed, the contributions that follow provide no
shortage of critical scrutiny, as well as praise and respect for his book.
The Symposium begins with contributions from three prominent con-
stitutional theorists. Rebecca Brown points out that most of the political
efforts to control the judiciary throughout American history that Friedman
so richly describes were ultimately unsuccessful.' Instead of demonstrating
that the American people "stand ready to pounce" if the Court "steps out of
line," Brown suggests that these events more plausibly demonstrate a public
2. Id. at 373.
3. William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in
American Public Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 623, 628.
4. See Rebecca L. Brown, Will and Principle, 2010 MicH. ST. L. REV. 569, 572-76.
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commitment to judicial independence: "We believe that in the long run we
as a democracy are better off having a court whose job it is to resolve foun-
dational questions free of popular pressure, and we will sacrifice short-term
victories in order to preserve the institution."' She claims that the Court's
decisions correspond with social practice over time because its "interpretive
practice follows the guidance of the principled constitutional theorists in
reading constitutional provisions in such a way as to incorporate judgments
about what liberties and what constraints we as a people are committed to."'
She therefore concludes that "Friedman's exposition of American practice
over the centuries . . . serves as a dramatic refutation of' originalism.7 By
Brown's account, however, judges are not political actors motivated by self-
interest to follow public opinion as a replacement for constitutional interpre-
tation, but rather they are independent arbiters of the principles to which the
American people have committed themselves, who wisely view public opi-
nion as an appropriate element of principled constitutional interpretation.'
Neil Siegel describes Friedman's thesis "that the Court's decisions on
socially salient issues tend to come into alignment 'over time' with popular
preferences,"' and explains that one of the implications is that "the actual
constitutional views and visions of the present members of the Court are of
quite limited significance."'o Siegel observes that, "[a]t bottom, The Will of
the People offers a kind of Coase Theorem for constitutional theory: Re-
gardless of the way the Court interprets the Constitution and initially assigns
constitutional entitlements, Americans will eventually bargain their way
toward an interpretation that reflects their considered judgment as a
people."" Siegel offers "some reasons to doubt that the substantive visions
of the justices themselves are as relatively inconsequential as Friedman
seems to believe." 2 Specifically, he points out that the Court frequently
shapes public values, and many of its controversial decisions address mat-
ters that are the subject of persistent disagreement." "The result is a broad
range of reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement within which the justices
will be relatively free to operate." 4 Siegel concludes that "the countermajo-
ritarian difficulty is not a puzzle that can be solved" because "[a]s long as
the Court affects final outcomes one way or another, the question of authori-
5. Id. at 576.
6. Id. at 580.
7. Id. at 581.
8. See id. at 580.
9. Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 583, 585 (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 383).
10. Id. at 586.
I1. Id. at 587.
12. Id. at 584.
13. See id at 588-93.
14. Id. at 593.
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ty that the countermajoritarian difficulty raises will continue to require an
answer."15
Lawrence Solum identifies and evaluates the positive and normative
claims of The Will of the People." As a positive matter, Solum suggests
that the subtitle of the book might have been: "How Popular Opinion Con-
trols the Supreme Court and Determines the Content of Constitutional
Law."" He points out, however, that positive legal theories generally seek
to "provide causal explanations for particular legal events or general event
types," and that "The Will of the People is a causally committed historical
narrative."" Solum asks whether historical narrative can provide "good and
sufficient reasons for the acceptance of causal claims,"20 and he concludes
that although "Friedman's narrative is suggestive," it "falls short of provid-
ing good and sufficient evidence for our acceptance of his broad causal
claims, because it lacks a rigorous account of causal mechanisms and em-
pirical confirmation of their operation."2' As a normative matter, Solum
suggests that the subtitle of the book might have been: "Why Popular Opi-
nion Should Influence the Supreme Court and Ought to Determine the
Meaning of the Constitution."22 He contends that Friedman implicitly
makes normative claims "about the nature of a democratic people and the
capacity of democratic will formulation to confer legitimacy on constitu-
tional practice," as well as the superiority of living constitutionalism over
originalism.23 Solum evaluates these alleged normative claims, and con-
cludes that they are not well-supported or persuasively established by
Friedman's historical narrative.24
After responding to The Will of the People from the vantage point of
constitutional theory, the Symposium provides reactions from two eminent
scholars of American constitutional history. William Novak points out that
Friedman's book is part of a broader explosion of constitutional history that
is being produced by law schools and political science departments." As a
professional historian, he suggests that
it is incumbent upon all practitioners of the craft to think seriously about what they
are doing and not doing, to be explicit about what they are doing and especially
15. Id. at 595.
16. Lawrence B. Solum, Narrative, Nonnativity, and Causation, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 597.
17. Id. at 598.
18. Id. at 599.
19. Id at 600.
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id. at 609.
22. Id at 598.
23. Id at 611; see also id. at 610-21.
24. See id. at 610-21.
25. See Novak, supra note 3, at 624-25.
[Vol. 2010:551554
HeinOnline  -- 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 554 2010
Responding to The Will of the People
how they are doing it, and to try to raise the bar generally for the practice of history
in law.26
He therefore evaluates Friedman's work pursuant to the standards of "three
entirely different styles and methods of legal-constitutional history: 1) syn-
thetic or narrative constitutional history; 2) the new socio-legal history; and
3) conceptual or analytical legal history." 27 Novak explains that narrative
synthesis is "[tlhe oldest kind of constitutional history in the United
States,"28 which focuses on telling the whole story rather than the parts, and
is necessarily restricted to relatively prominent figures and events. 29 Novak
concludes that "Friedman's book succeeds admirably as a one-volume narr-
ative history of U.S. Supreme Court judicial review."30 He claims, however,
that while the limitations of narrative synthesis have led most professional
historians to abandon this style or method, "legal scholars and political
scientists have pushed forward with narrative syntheses of United States
constitutional history with increasing abandon."3' Novak describes the new
socio-legal history that is currently favored by professional historians and
the conceptual or analytical legal history that likely reflects the wave of the
future, and he opines that the Will of the People is markedly less successful
when evaluated pursuant to those standards.32 Indeed, Novak concludes his
contribution by expressing a concern that
traditional narrative syntheses not only do not help unpack and scrutinize the di-
verse historical practices and social contexts and processes that give meaning to
ideas like popular sovereignty and democracy as they develop over historical time,
but that they actually work to continue to obscure them, thus giving comfort to
their enemies. 33
This leads Novak to convert his "simple book review" into a more general
critique of "a rising tide of whig history if not constitutional theology in
American public law," which produces stories that involve "not so much the
critical scrutiny of the past but 'the ratification if not the glorification of the
present' constitutional order of things."34
26. Id. at 630 (emphasis supplied).
27. Id. at 629.
28. Id. at 630.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 634.
31. Id. at 632; see also id. at 637 ("Though narrative synthesis has a central place in
historiography and will always be the most well-received kind of history among a popular
audience, narrative synthesis is not the way most legal and constitutional history is currently
written by professional historians.").
32. See id. at 638-53.
33. Id. at 656.
34. Id. (quoting HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 41-
42(1963)).
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Edward Purcell points out that The Will of the People differs from
most traditional constitutional law scholarship because instead of focusing
on the justices, theories of jurisprudence or constitutional interpretation, or
for that matter, the text of the Constitution or legal doctrine, Friedman relies
on the methods and insights of history and political science to develop "an
honest understanding of the evolving de facto relationship between public
opinion and the Supreme Court's distinctive practice of judicial review."35
Purcell distinguishes Friedman's book from Charles Warren's classic study,
The Supreme Court in United States History, on the grounds that Friedman
heralds the views and values of the American people, rather than the justic-
es, "as the ultimate constitutional authority and the key to the proper opera-
tion of the nation's constitutional system."" Purcell concludes that Fried-
man's view is "more acute and challenging,"37 and he identifies some of the
lessons that follow from Friedman's analysis of the relationship between the
Court and public opinion, including the historical inaccuracy of originalism
and the limitations of theories of regime politics, before considering other
fundamental questions that Friedman's book raises about American consti-
tutionalism." For example, Purcell suggests that Friedman's theory of con-
stitutional dialogue could be understood "as one more manifestation of the
salutary principle of separation of powers that lies at the heart of our consti-
tutional system, a principle that helps generate the system's power to in-
duce-generally, if not invariably, for the better-relatively slow, consi-
dered, stabilizing, and significantly consensus-based change."3 9 Finally,
Purcell discusses three specific issues that confronted the Court during the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and concludes that they con-
firm Friedman's basic thesis, even if they also suggest "some of the com-
plexities involved in attempting to specify the precise influence that public
opinion exerted on the Court at any given time."40
Because the United States is not the only contemporary democracy
with a high court that engages in judicial review, the Symposium also re-
sponds to The Will of the People from a comparative constitutional perspec-
tive. Cliff Carrubba utilizes "a general theory of judicial influence first de-
veloped in the comparative courts context to evaluate the role of the Su-
preme Court in the 1800s."41 In particular, he suggests that sovereign na-
35. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Barry Friedman's The Will of the People: Probing the
Dynamics and Uncertainties of American Constitutionalism, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 663,
664.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Id at 666.
38. See id. at 666-79.
39. Id. at 679.
40. Id. at 693; see also id. at 679-94.
41. Clifford J. Carrubba, Federalism, Public Opinion, and Judicial Authority in
Comparative Perspective, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 697, 697.
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tions "have the strongest incentive to create a common regulatory regime
when the policies they wish to enact entail a collective action dilemma" for
their constituent parts (such as the American states). 2 Carrubba explains
that the establishment of the American Constitution was consistent with this
incentive structure, but that more is required to explain the creation of a
federal judiciary with the power of judicial review.43 In addition to helping
ensure that the states comply with federal law, Carrubba contends that "the
Court plays a critical role by acting as a fire alarm and information clea-
ringhouse," which allows the states to achieve an optimal level of com-
pliance with the rules of the regulatory regime." He claims, however, that
"the influence of a court in this system is very selective" because it can only
facilitate compliance with a common regulatory regime when the state gov-
ernments want the regime's rules to be followed." Carrubba examines
Friedman's discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions from the founding
through the Gilded Age to evaluate the plausibility of these claims, and he
concludes that the Court's performance is consistent with his predictions
because most of its successes "were in helping resolve inter-state collective
action problems," whereas its efforts to exert influence in other areas with
clear winners and losers were largely unsuccessful." Carrubba concludes
that Friedman's historical narrative contains parallels to the more recent
experience of the European Court of Justice, which Carrubba has examined
in other work.47
Georg Vanberg points out that the flipside of Friedman's claim that
public opinion constrains the Supreme Court is that "public support for the
Court also provides the Justices with leverage," because it is politically
costly for other branches to challenge or resist the Court's pronounce-
ments.48 Vanberg explains that "[a] comparative perspective readily sug-
gests that this central point is not particular to the United States, but cap-
tures a more general feature of constitutional democracies,"' and he
proceeds to ask how high courts "achieve public recognition and a position
of influence in the first place . . . ?"o His answer is, in a word, "federal-
ism."" Specifically, Vanberg claims that federalism "almost always ensures
that there are parties who have an incentive to call on the constitutional
42. Id. at 702.
43. See id. at 703-04.
44. Id. at 705.
45. See id. at 707.
46. Id. at 712; see also id. at 707-12.
47. See id. at 713-15.
48. Georg Vanberg, The Will of the People: A Comparative Perspective on Fried-
man, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 717, 718.
49. Id. at 718-19.
50. Id. at 718.
51. Id. at 721.
Fall] 557
HeinOnline  -- 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 557 2010
Michigan State Law Review
court to resolve (certain) constitutional questions. State governments at-
tempting to assert themselves vis-A-vis the national government" and vice
versa." If neither side has the power to achieve dominance over the court,
"each will prefer the more modest goal of keeping the court independent of
the influence of other actors, that is, to defend the court's institutional posi-
tion in the face of attempts by other actors to bring it to heel."" Vanberg
contends that "given the right configuration of competing interests in a fed-
eral hierarchy-most obviously, opposition among state governments and
the national government-the political struggles among other institutions is
likely to provide a constitutional court with an environment in which it
can-at least on occasion-assert its powers."54 He goes on to explain that
"[t]he American and German experiences suggest that these struggles may
be sufficient to get a constitutional court 'off the ground' even in the ab-
sence of widespread public support or attention."" In the process, Vanberg
shows how the tensions that arose out of political competition between the
state and national governments helped to establish the authority of the con-
stitutional court in Germany and the Supreme Court in the United States.
The Symposium continues with contributions from several scholars
who are interested in the intersection of law and politics, beginning with
reactions to Friedman's book from a couple of the leading political scien-
tists on judicial politics. Anna Harvey points out that the historical narrative
of The Will of the People strongly suggests that "the Supreme Court is
extraordinarily responsive to the preferences of political majorities."" She
explains, however, that "Friedman's narrative . . . leaves open the question
of the source of this responsiveness."" She conducts an independent analy-
sis of "the Court's decisions in cases involving the constitutional review of
federal statutes from the Warren through the Rehnquist Courts" and reports
that her analysis "does not support the claim that the Court responds to pub-
lic opinion per se, independently of congressional preferences."" Rather,
Harvey reports that "the evidence supports the hypothesis that the Court
responds to the institutional incentives created by congressional leverage
over the Court."' She therefore concludes that "[t]hese results should redi-
rect our attention to the importance of institutional rules for incentivizing
judges into responsiveness to majoritarian preferences.""
52. Id. at 722.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 722-23; see also id. at 723-27.
56. See id. at 723-27.
57. Anna Harvey, The Will ofthe Congress, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 729, 729-30.
58. Id. at 729; see also id. at 730-31.
59. Id at 729; see also id. at 731-37.
60. Id. at 729; see also id. at 731-38.
61. Id. at 729, 732; see also id. at 737-38.
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Kevin McGuire expresses his general admiration for The Will of the
People, but he articulates several concerns with Friedman's approach from
the perspective of a political scientist.62 First, McGuire points out that the
widespread conception of the United States as a popular democracy (as op-
posed to a republican form of government) is a relatively new phenomenon,
and he suggests that differences in the prevailing understanding of the
American government over time are relevant in evaluating Friedman's anal-
ysis of the Court's early years: "If the justices did not conceive of them-
selves as operating within the context of a democratic government, then one
wonders just what would motivate the justices to consider mass opinion.""
Second, McGuire describes the difficulties associated with Friedman's ef-
fort to identify a coherent national opinion, particularly during this early
period,' and he claims that what Friedman documents primarily from
newspaper coverage "could just as easily be interpreted as the Supreme
Court's interplay with elite opinion, which-depending upon the era or the
specific legal issue-may not at all have aligned with the preferences of
citizens more generally."" Third, McGuire discusses the shortcomings of
Friedman's method of focusing on specific cases "to draw more general
inferences about the influence of mass opinion on the Court," and he points
out that most political scientists have eschewed this approach in favor of
aggregating the justices' decisions over time and testing "the impact of
changing public preferences on the movements in the broad ideological
output of the Court."" Finally, McGuire criticizes Friedman's book for
failing to specify "the precise causal mechanism by which public opinion
constrains the judgments of the justices,"67 and McGuire offers "a number
of ways in which to think about how public opinion may affect the Court,
each of which requires a unique set of assumptions about the structure of
governmental institutions and the motives of relevant actors.""
The final set of contributions to the Symposium involves efforts by le-
gal scholars who are interested in the intersection of law and politics to
build on Friedman's work in a variety of ways. Amanda Frost accepts
Friedman's thesis "that the U.S. Supreme Court and the American people
have reached a tacit agreement under which the Court may engage in judi-
cial review as long as it never strays too far from mainstream public opi-
nion," and she asks "how to justify the continued existence of the Supreme
62. See Kevin T. McGuire, Theory and Causation in Barry Friedman's The Will of
the People, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 741.
63. Id. at 744; see also id. at 743-47.
64. Id. at 747-49.
65. Id. at 749.
66. Id. at 750.
67. Id. at 752.
68. Id. at 752; see id. at 751-56.
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Court in light of its evolution from 'an institution intended to check the
popular will to one that frequently confirms it."' 9 Frost seeks to gain pur-
chase on this question and test Friedman's dialogic theory of judicial review
"by contrasting the constitutional decisions of the appointed, life-tenured
judges of the federal courts with those of elected state court judges."" She
briefly describes the empirical literature on this topic and reports that insu-
lated judges "have greater leeway to flout majority preferences than those
subject to periodic elections," and while "federal courts have a long history
of expounding on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, state court judges
are almost pathologically unwilling to engage in constitutional discourse,
preferring instead to defer to the federal judiciary's interpretation of the
Constitution."" Frost suggests that the systemic differences between ap-
pointed and elected judges can potentially be explained by the fact that
"even though federal judges are influenced by broadly held and sustained
public sentiment, they are insulated from electoral politics and all the distor-
tions of majority preferences that accompany elections."72 She also points
out that "federal judges have the benefit of appearing to be neutral and apo-
litical, even though they are not, and thus the public has greater tolerance
for judicial opinion than it does for more blatantly political decision-making
by the legislative and executive branches."" Accordingly, she worries that
"if Friedman is successful in convincing the public that the Supreme Court
is in fact a majoritarian institution, the Court's margin of decisional inde-
pendence and its role as catalyst for constitutional discourse might subse-
quently suffer."74
Corinna Barrett Lain points out that Friedman's thesis is based largely
on an external account of law that is independent of legal doctrine." Lain
suggests that this thesis could be strengthened by explicitly recognizing that
"sometimes-the relationship between the Supreme Court and majority will
is so strong that it seeps into the doctrinal fibers of the law itself."76 To this
end, Lain canvasses a wide variety of areas where the Court explicitly relies
on the position of a majority of state legislatures to determine the contours
of constitutional law. She considers why the justices might find explicitly
majoritarian doctrine attractive, and she suggests that the majority position
69. Amanda Frost, Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757,
757-58 (quoting Friedman, supra note 1, at 4).
70. Id. at 758.
71. Id. at 759; see also id at 760-64.
72. Id. at 764; see also id at 764-68.
73. Id. at 773; see also id. at 768-69.
74. Id. at 759-60.
75. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will, 2010 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 775.
76. Id at 776.
77. See id. at 777-86.
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of the states provides a relatively objective and contemporary measure to
guide the Court's discretionary judgment." Finally, Lain explains that
"even when the doctrine tells the Court to follow the majority position of
the states, the Justices' view of what that position is may nevertheless be
affected by larger, nondoctrinal, social and political currents."" According-
ly, she concludes that "in the end, it is still the case that the justices decide
questions of constitutional law the way they want to-and majoritarian
forces outside the law can affect how they want to rule.""
Lori Ringhand recognizes that "in contrast to most of the decisions is-
sued by the Court, a majority of Americans are aware of and have opinions
about the men and women who are nominated to sit on it," and "public opi-
nion about the nominee has a strong influence on a senator's vote for or
against the candidate."" She claims that "the confirmation process-or,
more precisely the confirmation process of nominees perceived as racial
outsiders-matters in part because such confirmations provide a high profile
arena in which we as Americans fight to constitute our national identity."82
Ringhand provides a detailed examination of the confirmation of Felix
Frankfurter, which involved the "first truly modem confirmation hearing,"
in addition to "a nominee who was perceived at the time as a racial outsid-
er."83 She focuses on "the stories of the Americans who showed up at the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in 1939 to protest Frankfurter's con-
firmation," who believed that they were "fighting for the very soul of their
country," and did so to a significant extent "in the language of race."84
Ringhand concludes that these stories illustrate "how constitutive of nation-
al identity the modem confirmation process has been since its very incep-
tion."85 She then turns to more recent confirmations involving candidates
who were perceived as racial outsiders" and shows "how the confirmation
battles that ensnared these nominees in many ways echoed, and in some
ways amplified, the debates about race and identity that were on such vivid
display in the Frankfurter confirmation."" She concludes with some
78. See id. at 786-89.
79. Id. at 789; see also id. at 789-93.
80. Id. at 793.
81. Lori A. Ringhand, Aliens on the Bench: Lessons in Identity, Race and Politics
from the First "Modern" Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing to Today, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 795, 796.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 797; see also id, at 797-825.
85. Id. at 797.
86. See id. at 825-33.
87. Id. at 797.
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thoughts on "what the similarities-and differences-among these hearings
tell us about the role of such confirmations in our national discourse.""
My contribution describes some of the conceptual difficulties and
measurement problems associated with the idea of "the will of the people.""
I suggest that Friedman's story could be reconstructed to stand for the prop-
osition that "the Court needs the support of powerful friends or allies" to
make bold or controversial decisions.o I explain that "if the will of the
people cannot accurately be measured, and the Court needs the support of
powerful friends or allies, then the role of elected officials and other public
institutions in influencing constitutional meaning necessarily takes on in-
creased importance."" I describe recent scholarship by Bill Eskridge, John
Ferejohn, and others, which recognizes "that legislation and administrative
law perform important constitutional functions in the modem regulatory
state,"" and that the Constitution and the institutions and norms established
by statutes and regulations have a reciprocal relationship.93 I claim that by
integrating "Friedman's theory of constitutional dialogue with the lessons of
'administrative constitutionalism,' we can develop a better understanding of
the entire process of constitutional change."94 After articulating the frame-
work for understanding the process of American constitutional change that
emerges from this exercise, I conclude by identifying the key questions that
are raised by this framework and discussing a few of its most important
implications.9 5
While the foregoing contributions are both rich and diverse, a number
of prominent themes emerged from the papers. For example, several partic-
ipants recognized the theoretical and practical difficulties of defining "the
people" and accurately measuring their will on the complex legal and policy
questions that are typically confronted by the Supreme Court. Several par-
ticipants wondered precisely what makes the Court follow the will of the
people and claimed that Friedman's narrative did not (and perhaps could
not) establish the operative causal mechanisms. Given the Court's leeway
to decide difficult constitutional questions in various ways, some partici-
pants doubted that Friedman has solved (or could solve) the countermajori-
tarian difficulty. Nonetheless, there was broad sympathy for the notion that
judicial review involves some form of dialogue between the Court and other
members of society. Moreover, several contributors agreed that Friedman's
88. Id.; see also id at 834-35.
89. See Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a Republic of Statutes, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 840-47.
90. See id. at 847-52.
91. See id. at 851-52.
92. Id. at 852.
93. See id. at 852-67.
94. See id. at 867-70.
95. See id. at 870-75.
562 [Vol. 2010:551
HeinOnline  -- 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 562 2010
Responding to The Will of the People
narrative powerfully demonstrates the inadequacies of originalism-at least
as a description of how the Court has interpreted the Constitution over the
course of our nation's history. Most of the contributors were convinced by
Friedman's claim that the Court both reflects and shapes our evolving be-
liefs and attitudes about some of the most fundamental issues facing our
society. Finally, and in a sense most fundamentally, the contributions to
this Symposium illustrate the benefits and challenges of multi-disciplinary
work and the importance of facilitating and maintaining a dialogue among
scholars with different ways of studying our common interests and prob-
lems.
Barry Friedman's response performs this task in a particularly tren-
chant fashion by addressing the strongest criticisms that are levied against
his book by the contributions to this Symposium.96 He therefore focuses on
"the sort of interdisciplinary endeavor the book represents" and claims that
"when it comes to choosing and addressing the questions of academic study,
a catholic approach is in order."" Rather than adhering to a single discipli-
nary approach or methodology, Friedman suggests that "we should be open
to a variety of approaches, sensitive to what each can actually offer to the
broader intellectual project."" Similarly, he claims that "normative work
must respect the methodology and results of positive scholarship" and that
normative and positive scholarship "must work synergistically as well."99
Friedman begins his response by describing "the making of The Will
of the People" in some detail," and he observes that "our highest calling as
academics is to follow the questions we encounter where they lead, doing
our best to answer them," which often means "spilling across disciplinary
boundaries."o' He proceeds to discuss "the ways of history," because "The
Will of the People is a historical narrative, albeit informed by political
science, and aimed at answering a question critical in both law and poli-
96. See Barry Friedman, The Method of The Will of the People: Some Reflections on
the Interdisciplinary Endeavor, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877.
97. Id. at 877-78. Friedman claims that "a few of the participants resisted the con-
clusions or implications of The Will of the People not on the basis of its argument or evi-
dence there, but because of its methodology," and explains that he therefore "decided to
devote [his] remarks in response not to substantive objections, but to questions of methodol-
ogy." Id. at 884.
98. Id. at 878.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 879-85. By his account, Friedman started working on The Will of the
People seventeen years ago. That means that he began working on the book in 1993, my
first year as a student at Vanderbilt University Law School. Friedman was one of my profes-
sors at Vanderbilt (along with Rebecca Brown); and, indeed, I served as one of his early
research assistants on (what ultimately became) this project. It gives me great pleasure to be
able to say that I was there at both the beginning and the end of his work on this book.
101. Id. at 884.
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tics." 2 In response to Professor Novak, Friedman expresses his thoughts
on the sources and questions of history and the types of historical inquiry
that have value, and he contends that, ultimately, "the test of history is
whether it asks a meaningful question, and whether it employs the tools that
address the question being asked in a way calculated to teach us some-
thing."o3 Friedman also clarifies and defends his method of constructing
"the will of the people."'" Specifically, he reiterates that "[p]ublic opinion
is a collage of ever-shifting views,"' points out that the book provides
"somewhat of a chronology of the many changing ways we have constituted
ourselves as people over time," 06 and explains the connection between his
construction of "the people" and the history of the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty as follows:
But here's the crucial point that critics of my construction of "the people"
seem to miss (drum-roll please): those who leveled the countermajoritarian criti-
cism of judicial review themselves constructed "the people" in all these different
ways throughout time. And, as I discuss events and periods, my "People" are the
very ones that the opponents of judicial review sought to construct.... The book
has a variety of messages, but undoubtedly a prominent one is that the constructed
"people" didn't always or actually oppose either the institution of judicial review,
or the results, as has been claimed.
If anything, I'd have thought it would leap out that the "counter-majoritarian"
difficulty is itself historically contingent in just these ways. As I hope TWOTP
documents well, the claims against judicial review were products of their time....
Indeed, opponents of judicial review, rather predictably, constructed the "people"
in opposition to the Court in ways that suited them best. What I try to show is that
the "countermajoritarian" claim about judicial review was itself often overstated,
either by questioning the construction of the "people," or by trying to measure
popular views more accurately. 0 7
Friedman humorously suggests that instead of referring throughout his book
to "the popular will," it may have been more accurate to refer to "the thing,"
or "the ever-changing and shifting thing against which judicial review is
juxtaposed," or perhaps "[t]he Will of the People Who Others Claim Op-
pose Judicial Review," but he recognizes that these alternatives would have
severely undermined the elegance of his narrative.'o
Friedman goes on to respond to the concerns raised by political scien-
tists and others regarding the "causal mechanism" that motivates the claims
102. Id. at 885; see also id. at 885-96.
103. Id. at 893.
104. See id. at 893-96.
105. Id. at 894 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Friedman, supra note 1, at 17).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 894-95.
108. Id. at 895.
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in The Will of the People and their skepticism that it is "the people" who are
influencing individual Supreme Court decisions.'09 Friedman explains that
the book's conclusion "doesn't discuss one causal mechanism; it raises the
possibility of several of them.""o Given the limitations in our empirical
knowledge, he reiterates that "[w]hat we know is tentative; it may amount to
little more than an agenda for future research.""' Friedman is adamant,
however, that "there is a real need to understand how judicial review actual-
ly operates, and to stop simply saying trite things about it."" 2 At the same
time, Friedman contends that "[t]oo often, quantitative empirical work tends
to lead to data-driven hypotheses, the maintenance of which requires block-
ing out the message of the real world.""' For example, even in the absence
of irrefutable empirical support, Friedman believes that "[t]he most likely
causal stories about Court-politics interaction involve immediate reaction to
individual Supreme Court decisions."" 4 After all, his book "tells story after
story in which it is the individual case, and the public reaction to it, that
later affects decisions in the same area.""' Once again, Friedman's larger
point is that history and quantitative empiricism both have their places-
"the trick is to understand the strengths and limitations of any given method
vis a vis the question one is trying to answer.""' In short, history can help
us to generate the most realistic or plausible hypotheses, while quantitative
empiricism can help us to confirm or refute them.
Friedman goes on to explain that his book "was intended largely as a
descriptive and positive project, one designed to call into question predomi-
.nant understandings of how judicial review actually operates in the real
world.""' In particular, his two primary positive claims were that "over
time the American people have acclimated themselves to the idea of judicial
review"" 8 and that "the Court's decisions on salient issues have tended to
come into line over time with popular preferences."' ' Friedman acknowl-
edges, however, that the book's conclusion "offers a normative take on
judicial review," which is that its most important function "is to foster di-
alogue among the public about our constitutional commitments" and to rati-
fy the consensus that ultimately emerges.'20 Although the book endorses
109. See id. at 896-905.
110. Id. at 898.
111. Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 373).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 900.
114. Id. at 903.
115. Id. at 904.
116. Id. at 897.
117. Id. at 905.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 906 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Siegel, supra note 9, at 594).
120. Id.
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this function for judicial review, Friedman maintains that "the normative
take in the Conclusion of TWOTP is hardly unfailingly rosy."121 Rather,
Friedman explains that the book "seeks to place responsibility for the insti-
tution where . . . it ultimately rests, as must all institutions in a democracy:
in the hands of that ineffable 'people."'l 22 He also suggests that his conclu-
sion "offers the beginning of .. . a far sounder critique of the institution of
judicial review than the often unsubstantiated claims about the countermajo-
ritarian difficulty; it points toward possible market failures, where the Court
is still countermajoritarian in troubling ways."' 23
After responding to a number of the points raised by the constitutional
theorists,124 Friedman returns to William Novak's concern that The Will of
the People may serve as an apology for the existing status quo.25 1In seeking
to refute this criticism, Friedman distinguishes between the descriptive and
the normative aspects of his narrative, and he reiterates the precise nature of
his project and claims:
To return to where this response began, I was writing against a claim, omnipresent
throughout American constitutional history, that the institution of judicial review
was inconsistent with the popular will. What I set out to show-indeed, what I
think I did show-is that over time public opinion, revealed by polls, and by events
just like those highlighted by Rebecca Brown, have supported the institution. And,
when there was serious opposition to those opinions in the court of public opinion,
the decisions were in fact reversed by the Court. Not always immediately (see
above). Often at cost (see above). But over time, on the salient issues, the Ameri-
can people have generally had their way.
Indeed, contrary to the book Novak seems to have read, the point of TWOTP was
to empower democracy ... [by placing] responsibility for our Constitution square-
ly where it belongs, on our own shoulders. . . . What TWOTP was all about was
taking this juxtaposition of People v. Court, in which the Court somehow is said to
always defeat the People, and suggest a counter-narrative: ultimately it is the
People that must decide among and for themselves.126
Regardless of the merits of the foregoing debates, I know that one of
Professor Friedman's goals in his recent work, and in writing The Will of
the People in particular, was to bring scholars with similar interests and
different perspectives together so that we could all learn from each other.
This Symposium should guarantee that his book is a success on that level,
as well as on many others. I have already learned a lot from Barry Fried-
man,127 and I have learned even more about our common interest in constitu-
tionalism from all of the participants in this Symposium. I am grateful to all
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 907-16.
125. See id. at 916-20.
126. Id. at 919.
127. See supra note 100.
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of them for contributing to this project, and I look forward to an ongoing
constitutional dialogue.
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